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[L. A. No. 19512 In Bank. May 21, 1946.]

W. S. RATTRAY, Respondent, v. HUBERT B. SOUDDER
88 Real Estate Commissioner. etc., Appellant.
[1] Appeal-Moot Questions.-An appeal from a judgment grant
ing a writ of mandate commanding the Real Estatc Commis
sion to revoke an order cancelling a broker's license, doe
not become moot because the license would have expired .
any event prior to determination of the appeal.
[2a-2c] Brokers-Duties-Good Faith.-A real estate broker ~
tained by an owner of realty to find a purchaser for the proP4
erty violated hi!' fiduciary duties where, without disclosin~
to his prineipal that he had fOlmd 8 purchaser, he made mis~
representations thAt he was unable to sell the property at thtj
agreed price. and by untruthful and misleAdintz statement4
induced his principal to reduce the price placed on the proPi
erty and to sell it to the hrokera/!,e flrm of which he was '1
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member. The fact that the prospective purchaser would
need a loan to cover the greater part of the purchase priee
afforded no excuse for the broker's conduct.
Id.-Duties-Disclosure.-A real estate agent is charged with
the duty of fullest disclosure of all material facts concerning
the transaction that might affect the prinoipal's deoision.
(Civ. Code. § 2230.)
Vendor and Purchaser-Options-To Whom Given.-A broker
employed to tind purchasers for the property of his principal
can be given an option, running ooncurrently with the agenoy,
to purchase the property.
Brokers-Duties-Good Faith.-If a broker employed to sell
real property is also given an option to purchase the property himself, he cannot, when pursuing his own interests,
ignore those of his principal, and he will not be permitted to
enjoy the fruits of an advantage taken of a fiduoiary relation.
Agency - Fiduciary Relation Between Principal and Agent.- :
One who acts as an agent and also deals with his prmeipAI
as to the subject matter of the agency cannot take advantage
of his principal by withholding from him information secured :
by means of the agency

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of.
Kern County and from an order taxing costs. Warren
Stockton. Judge. Reversed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel Real Estate Com-.
missioner to revoke order cancelling a broker's license. Judg-:
ment granting writ reversed.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Walter L. Bowers,
Assistant Attorney General, .and Carl S .. Kegley, Deputy
Attorney' General; :(pi- -Aplieliant. .
Mack, Werdel & Bianco and D. Bianco for Respondent.
Hyman & Hyman as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By an order issued April 10, 1944, defendant revoked plaintiff's license as a real estate broker.
The trial court issued a writ of mandamus commanding
defendant to set aside this order. Defendant appeals.
[4] See 4 Cal.Jur. 554; 8 Am.Jur. 1040.
(5] See 1 Ca.l.Jur. 788; 2 Am.Jur. 203.
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upon this belief the complainant accepted the $10;250 net cash
for the said property, and would not have done so but for his
reliance upon that belief and understanding;
"That prior to Apx.:il 15, 1943, the said defendant Rattray
negotiated with one David L. Espey for the purchase of said
property for the total price of $13,500; that on April 16,
1943, the property was sold to David L. Espey, and placed in
escrow, for the sum of $13,500; that by refinancing, and the
complainant deeding the property to defendant Edward A.
Kelly, who in turn in the same escrow, deeded the property
to David L. Espey, the escrow was duly closed;
"That notwithstanding the negotiations with David L.
Espey, the defendant Rattray did not disclose the same to
complainant, and at no time told him that he was attempting
to sell the property for $13,500; that after all expenses wert
paid incident to the transaction, defendant Edward A. Kelly
received the sum of $2,326.25, together with a note signed by
David L. Espey in the sum of $700; that out of the cash received by defendant Edward A. Kelly, the sum of approximately $900 was paid to defendant Rattray;
"That all of the correspondence, negotiations, and representations made in this matter were carried on and made by
defendant Rattray; that each and every one of the letters to
complainant were on the letterheads of Kelly & Son, and
signed 'W. S. Rattray for Kelly & Son'; that defendant
Edward A. Kelly, during the negotiations, did not in any way
communicate with complainant, and therefore it is not clear
that he had guilty knowledge of the statements and representations made to complainant by defendant Rattray; that inasmuch as there is some doubt in this regard, the Commissioner
will waive the doubt in favor of defendant Edward A. Kelly."
Defendant concluded that the revocation of plaintiff's license was warranted under sections 10176(f) and 10177(f) of
-the Business -and Professions Code: "The commissioner may,
upon his own motion, and shall upon the verified complaint
in writing of any person, investigate the actions of any person
engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a real
estate licensee within this State, and he may temporarily
suspend or permanently revoke a real estate license at any time
where the licensee within the immedhtely preceding three
years, while a real estate licensee, in performing or attempting to perform any of the acts within the scope of this chapter
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Plaintllr is a real estate broker associated with Kelly &
Son in Bakersfield. Upon a complm.int filed with defendant by
John L. Humston, then a lieutenant in the United States
Army, defendant initiated proceedings against plaintllr and
Edward A. Kelly for the revocation of their licenses as real·
estate brokers. After a hearing defendant made the following
findings: "That on or about January 19, 1943, defendant
Rattray addressed a letter to complainant requesting price
and terms on property, consisting of a seven-unit court, which
he owned in Bakersfield, California; that on February 4,
1943, the complainant replied, and placed a price of $13,000
on said property, and also stated that he would consider any
fair offer; that on February 11, 1943, defendant Rattray
wrote a second letter to complainant advising him that the
property had been apraised by a competent appraiser; th:lt
$12,000 would be a fair price, and that selling commission
would be added; that in said letter was enclosed an instrument, designated as an option, for a sixty-day period, in favor
of Kelly & Son, embodying the selling price of $12,000, for
the signature of the complainant; that relying on those representations the complainant signed said option, and returned
it to defendants; that on March 20, 1943, a third letter was
addressed to complainant by defendant Rattray stating that
in trying to sell the property he was meeting with certain
obstacles, namely, the price and the fact that the property
was in an unrestricted district, and suggested to complainant
that the price be reduced to $10,000 cash, which he thought
the complainant would be wise in accepting, and pressed said
complainant for an immediate acceptance so that the transaction might be consummated 'within the period of our exclusive listing'; that on April 15, 1943, a long distance telephone
conversation was held between defendant Rattray and the
complainant, at which time defendant Rattray repeated that
$10,000 net was the v;erybest price that he could obtain; that
complainant countered I by stating he would accept no less than
$10,500 net cash, but finally compromised on a price of
$10,250 net cash with no expense to him in the transaction;
"That during the negotiations with complainant as set out
in the preceding paragraph, defendant Rattray led complainant to believe that he was acting as his agent in this
transaction, and when terms and price were agreed upon, that
all necessary expenses incident to thc sale, together with the
~ 5% selling commission, would be added, and relying
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/

218

RA '!'TRAY t1. SCUDDER

[28 C.2d

has been guilty of any of the following: ••• Any other conduct, whether of the same or a different character than specified in this section, which constitutes fraud or dishonest dealing." (§ 10176(f» "The commissioner may suspend or revoke
the license of any real estate licensee, who within three years
immediately preceding has done any of the following: •••
Acted or conducted himself in a manner which would have
warranted the denial of his application for a real estate license,
or for a renewal thereof." (§ 10177 (f»- A real estate license
can be denied if the applicant fails to furnish proof of "honesty, truthfulness and good reputation." (§§ 10150, 10152.)
The trial court did not hear any additional evidence. Basing its findings on the commissioner's record of the two hearings before the commissioner, the trial court found: "it is
true that at neither of said hearings was there any evidence
that the plaintiff herein was acting as the agent for the complainant John L. Humston; it is true that said John L. Humston never agreed to pay any commission to the plaintiff herein
for any of the services of the plaintiff; it is true that the
complainant John L. Humston on February 15, 1943, executed to the plaintiff herein and his associates an option to
purchase the real property of the complainant; it is true
that at no time pertinent herein did the relationship of principal and agent ever exist between the plaintiff herein and the
said complainant Jolm L. Humston; it is true that at no time
pertinent herein did any relationship of trust and confidence
ever exist between the plaintiff herein and the said complainant John L. Humstonj it is true that the plaintiff herein in
handling the transaction referred to in the complaint of said
John L. Humston filed with the defendant herein was not
guilty of any conduct which constituted fraud or dishonest
dealing and had not acted or conducted himself in any man~-'-'--- -.---.------- ,,--.- .
ner which would have warranted the denial of his application
for a license or of the renewal of his then existing license."
With respect to the commissioner's findings the trial court
·Under the statute in effect at the time of plainti11"s activities (§ 12 of
the Real Estate Act as amended by Stats. 1947, p. 2124), the commissioner could revoke the license of any licensee who within the immediately
preceding three years condueted himself in a manner that would hav·c
warranted the denial of his application for a license or a renewal thereof,
or who was guilty of any conduct constituting fraud or dishonest dealing.
Those provisions were incorporated without cha.nge into sections 10176(f)
and 10177(f) of the Business and Professions Code (Stats. 1943, ell. 127
§ 1, p. 841-842) under which plaintiff's license was revoked.
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found: "it is true that the said findings do not support the
order of the defendant revoking the license of the plaintiff
and it is true that the evidence does not support the order of
the defendant in revoking the license of the plaintiff j it is
true that in revoking the license of the plaintiff the said defendant acted arbitrarily, capriciously and contrary to law and
that his findings and order are unsupported by evidence."
[1] In this state all real estate licenses expire automatically on June 30th of each year. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10200.)
The present litigation has not become moot because plaintiff'!!
license would have expired in any event on June 30, 1944.
The rights of plaintiff depend on whether or not that license
was v.alidly revoked, for if it was, a new license may be withheld on the same ground. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 10150,
10153.)
In determining this appeal it is not necessary to discuss
the scope of review by the trial court of the commissioner'R
proceedings (see Dare v. Medical Examiners, 21 Ca1.2d 790
[136 P.2d 304]: Sipper v. Urban, 22 Ca1.2d 138, 140 [137
P .2d 425]), for even if the record of these proceedings is read
as if the evidence before the commissioner had been taken by
the trial court itself, the trial court's decision finds no support
in the evidence.
The evidence shows without conflict that plaintiff was employed by Humston as a broker. The correspondence initiating the relation between Humston and plaintiff leaves no doubt
that plaintiff offered Humston his services as a broker and
that Humston retained him in that capacity. On January 19,
1943, plaintiff wrote to Humston on stationery of "Kelly &
Son, licensed real estate brokers" as follows: "We have a
client who is interested in purchasing property in this dis-trictand thought you might wish to sell your property. Accordingly, we will be p~eased to receive the price and terms
acceptable to you, and enclose stamped envelope for your reply." When Humston advised plaintiff that he was willing
to sell the property for $13,000, to take a small second mortgage, and to consider any fair offer, plaintiff replied: "Our
prospective buyer lives in Taft, so we will not contact him
until we have heard from you again. We have had your property appraised by a competent appraiser. Considering the age
of buildings and furniture, which has a heavy depreciation,
a fair price would be $12,000.00 To this we would have to

\
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add the selling cOullnission presuming that we can arrive at
a mutually satisfactory basis. We are enclosing herewith an
option for your signature. Upon receipt of the signed option
and )'our repJy, we will proceed with the work of closing the
sale. Please state what terms you are willing to make in the
space marked with the cross. It may be that our client will
not rcquire any terms, but in the event he should, we would
like to know what to quote him." These letters were introduced in evidence before the commissioner and there was no
evidence contradicting them. They show indisputably that
plaintiff offered his services and was employed to find a purchaser willing and able to acquire the property for $12,000
plus a selling commission for plaintiff. Plaintiff himself testified as to his first letter: "My purpose' for writing the letter
was to get a listing of the property so I could sell it, provided
I would be able to have authority to sell the property-to any
person whom I might contact who was willing to buy it."
The evidence also shows without conflict that once plaintiff
was employed by Humston he reported to him as a broker
tloes to hi'! principal. Uncontradicted documentary evidence
was introduced, a letter by plaintiff to Humston, written more
than a month after their initial correspondence stating: "We
have been diligently working to find a purchaser for the
Court on 'P' Street, but two of the obstacles in the way of
effecting a sale have been: First, the district being unrestricted has been objectionable to two or three people who
otherwise might have considered tIle property. The second
objection is the price. AB the property was purchased through
thi~ office. we are able to arrive at a more definite valuation
than some other office who might not be as well posted as we
are. Our purpose for writing you this morning is to inquire
whether you would consider $10,000.00 cash, as we have a
prospectnow;-whO -will likely purchase this property providing we can do som~ financing for him. Since buying the property through this office some years ago, there has been a depreciation of 3% a year, which would total at least $2,000.00.
We, therefore, believe that under present conditions you would
be wise in accepting this cash offer, providing we are able to
-arrange the financing as hereinabove referred to. Will you
therefore, let us know immediately if this will be acceptable
to you, so that we can proceed with our work. In the event
you would consider this offer, we would most likely be able
to give you definite information on the sale within the period
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of our exclusive listing." The ~vidence of this letter that
plaintiff acted as a broker and represented himself to Humston as such is corroborated by his own testimony: "I cannot
give the verbatim-along the lines of selling the propertytold him working diligently on it-had several inquiriesseveral had complained about the price being too high-told
him had advertised it for fifteen thousand and then thirteen
and showed him the ads-others had complained about the
unrestricted district-the objections that I pointed out to him.
However, I would do the very best I can and get in touch."
It is clear that this conversation could not have occurred had
not plaintiff considered himself Humston's broker and actively
sought 8 purchaser.
The evidence also shows without conflict that after plaintiff
secured a purchaser for the property he violated his fiduciary
duties as a broker and by untruthful and misleading statements induced his principal to reduce the price placed upon
the property and to sell it to plaintiff's firm. The testimony
of Mr. Espey, who acquired the property, was uncontradictt'c1
that he saw plaintiff in the latter part of March and told him
that though he deemed the property worth not more thall
$12,500 he would be willing to buy it for $13,500. "I told
him I knew that I was light as far as the down payment was
concerned; that I had another property on Parkway and
Pine that I could use as a possible-as part of the down
payment. I told him at the time that because of the neighborhood that I did not consider the property worth any more
than $12,500, but would be willing to give $13,500 because
of the way I would be buying it-that the property itself,
regular income and that sort of thing seemed to make it a
profitable venture and I would be willing to take o:ver.the _______..
deal on that basis." Espey also testified without contradiction that a week or more after this first conversation he had
another conversation with plaintiff in which plaintiff told
him that he had not been able to induce the owner of the
property, Mr. Humston, to reconsider the price that he was
asking for the property, that he had some doubt whether he
would be able to let Espey have the property for $13,000 and
t.hat there might be some difficulty in financing the deal
because of the sma]] amount of cash that Espey had but that
Espey should leave the matter in plaintiff's han(ffl. Plaintiff's
firm got in touch with one Ceccarelli and his wife, who had
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done business with Kelly & Son for twenty-five years, with
regard to a loan to Espey. They first discussed the matter with
Mrs. Ceccarelli and showed her the property and later showed
the property to Ceccarelli. The first installment of the loan
was received on April 16, 1943, and the balance on April 30,
1943. On April 15th plaintiff had a long distance telephone
conversation with Humston as follows: "I told Lt. Humston
that I was unable to sell his property for the price he had
placed upon it, and the only way we could get him $10,000
cash would be to buy it ourselves. He said 'I won;t accept it;
I will accept $10,500, if that is all you will give.' I said
'we will not pay $10,500; we will pay $10,000.00.' He said,
'Will you pay $10,2507' I said 'Will you accept $10,250.001' 'Yes,' he said, 'I think, I will.' I said 'Will you
confirm that by wire?' That was the entire conversation as
I recall." Plaintiff's own testimony thus shows that he did
not reveal to Humston that Espey was willing to buy the
property for a price exceeding the $12,000 that Humston had
originally asked for the property or the amount of $10,750
that he had asked later, but made the untruthful statements
to Humston that "I was unable to sell his property for the
price he had placed upon it" and that "the only we could
get him $10.000 cash would be to buy it ourselves." After
receiving Humston's telegram reducing the price to $10,250
plaintiff sold the property to Espey the next day, April 16,
1943, for $13,500. Documentary evidence introduced before
the commissioner showed without conflict that Espey signed
the note for the loan of $12.500 and the deed of trust securing
it on April 16th; that on the same day the escrow instructions
were given by Espey; that both sales, the sale by Humston
to Kelly & Son and the sale by Kelly & Son to Espey, were
completed in the same escrow; that Kelly & Son or plaintiff
never paid any part of the purchase price to Humston from
their own funds. but received out of the escrow about $12,800
in cash and a note of about $700 secured by second deed of
trust; and that the $10,250 paid by Kelly & Son to Humston
were simply deducted from the cash amount of $12,800 received by Kelly & Son.
[2a] In the light of the uncontradicted documents and
plaintiff's own testimony, it cannot be questioned that plaintiff
violated the fiduciary duties of a real estate agent, for "The
law of California imposed on ... the real estate agent the
same obligation of undivided service and loyalty that it im-
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poses on a trustee in favor of his beneficinry. Violation of his
trust is subject to the same punitory consequences that are
provided for a disloyal or recreant trustee. (King v. Wise,
43 Cal. 628.)" (Langford v. Thomas, 200 Cal. 192, 196 [252
P. 602].) [3] Such an agent is charged with the duty of
fullest disclosure of all material facts concerning the transaction that might affect the principal's decision. (Civ. Code,
§ 2230: Langford v. Thomas, supra, 197; Williams v. Lockwood, 175 Cal. 598, 601 [16S P. 587]; Feckenscher v. Gamble,
12 Cal.2d 482, 495 [85 P.2d 885]; Cur1'y v. King, 6 Cal.App.
568, 575 [92 P. 662]; S~"lver v. Logue, 127 Cal.App. 565, 571
[16 P.2d 183]; Jolton v. Minster, Graf <17 Co., 53 Cal.App.2d
516, 522 [128 P.2d 101]; Baird v. Madsen, 57 Cal.App.2d
465.476 [134 P.2d 885].) [2b] In the present case, there can
be no doubt that Humston would not have sold the property
to Kelly & Son for $10,250 had he lmown that Espey stood
ready to buy the property for $13,500. Nor could plaintiff
have any doubt that had Humston lmown this fact he would
not have sold the property to Kelly & Son. He not only failed
to disclose the truth but made the misrepresentation that he
was unable to sell the property at the price placed upon it by
Humston. Even if plaintiff had not been Humston's broker
and under no fiduciary duties, once he discussed the question
whether a higher price was obtainable, he had to "speak the
whole truth, and not by partial suppression or concealment
make the utterance untruthful and misleading." (American
Trust Co. v. California etc. Ins. Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 65 [98
P.2d 497].)
The finding of the trial court that there was no evidence
that plaintiff was acting as Humston's agent is so clearly
inconsistent with the documentary evidence as well as plain-·
tiff's own testimony that it c1.n be explained only as being
based upon the theory that, since plaintiff's firm had an option to purchase and did purchase the property, plaintiff
could deal with Humston at arm's length and was not bound
by any fiduciary duties. It does not follow, however, that
plaintiff was not acting as a broker in this matter. [4] It is
well settled that a broker employed to find purchasers for the
property of his principal can be given an option, "running
concurrent with the agency" to purchase the property. (W. G.
Reese Co. v. House, 162 Cal. 740, 744 [124 P. 442]; Burt v.
Stringfellow, 48 Utah 330 [159 P. 527]; Neighbor v. PQ,cijic
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Realty Association, 40 Utah 610 [124 P. 523, 34 Ann. Cas. ,
1914D 1200]; Walling v. Poulsen, 160 Mich. 392 [125 N.W.
373]; Rest., Agency, § 390; see 4 Cal.Jur. 554; 12 C.J.S. 33;
8 Am. Jur. 1040.) [6] In such a case, the broker, when pursuing his own interests, cannot ignore those of his principal

and will not "be permitted to enjoy the fruits of an advantagel
taken of a fiduciary relation, whose dominant characteristic!
is the confidence reposed by one in another." (Curry v. King,1
B'Upra, 6 Cal.App. 568, 575.) It haR therefore been statedl
that, "The law does not allow the agent who has also a right
l
to purchase to wait until someone make..~ an offer of an amount:
in excess of the agreed purchase price and then elect to pur-I!
chase the property at the lesser price without informing the
owner of the higher offer, and after the agent has obtainedl
the consent from the owner to buy the property, then immeJ
diately sell it for the higher price M hill ~wn propertY.'J
(Neighbor v. Pacific Realty Association, supra, 40 Utah 6101
[124 P. 523, 34 Ann.Cas. 1914D 1200].) The law is well
summarized in 8 American Jurisprudence 1040: "If a broke~
employed to sell property is also given ... an option to pur~
chase the property himself. he occupies the dual status o~
agent and purchaser and he is not entitled to exercise his
option except by divesting himself of his obligation as agent
by making a full disclosure of any information in his posses~
sion as to the prospect of making a sale to another.... Bu~
if he exercises his option before any negotiations for its sale
to another have been made and without knowledge of anyone
wishing to purchase, he is not obliged to account to the ownei
on resale to another." [6] One who acts as an agent and alsd
deals with his principal as to the subject matter of the agenci
cannot take advantage of his principal by withholding from
him information secured by means of the agency. In th~
language of the Restatement of Agency: "Before dealing
with the principal on his own account . . . an agent has •
duty, not only to make no misstatements of fact, but also tI
disclose to theprmcipaf1all material facts fully and eom~
pletely. A fact is material ... if it is one which the agent
should realize would be likely to affect the judgment of th~
principal in giving his consent to the agent to enter into th~
particular transaction on the specified term. Hence, th~
disclosure must include not only the fact that the agent ill
acting on his own account ..., but also all other facts whicb
he Ihould realize have or are likely to have a bearing upon tht
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desirability of the transaction from' the viewpoint of the
principal." (§ 390, Comment a.) [2c] When plaintiff disclosed no more to his principal than that KeBy & Son was buying the property he feB short of his duties as an agent. It was
his duty to advise Humston ful1y of the pending negotiations with Espey. Plaintiff not only violated his fiduCiary
duty of disclosure, but went beyond the limit"l that the law
draws even for one who has no fiduciary duties, for he misrepresented the facts when he assured Humston that he could
not obtain the price placed upon the property and that Humston could do no better than to sell to KeBy & Son at a reduced price. The fact that Espey had only $400 cash and that
therefore the greater part of the purchase price had to be
covered by a loan affords no excuse for plaintiff's conduct.
From the standpoint of the seller Espey was as much a cash
buyer as one who did not need a loan. It was immaterial to
Humston whether the cash came from the purchaser's own
funds or whether he had to secure it from a lender. Since
Kelly & Son's sale to Espey resulted in the receipt of approximately $12.800 cMh it is clear that Humston would have
gained more from a sale to Espey than the one to Kelly &
Son, Moreover it wa~ understood that plaintiff would attempt
to obtain a loan for a purchaser. In one of his letters plain,
tiff asked Humston whether he "would consider $10,000
cash, as we have a prospect now who will likely purchase this
property providing we can do some financing for him." It
does not matter, however, whether plaintiff was under any
obligation to Humston to attempt to secure a loan for Espey.
The deciRive consideration is that when he suggested to Humston that the latter sell the property to plaintiff's firm, he
was under a duty to disclose that Espey would pay $13,500----------for the property if his purchase could be financed by a private loan and to disclose the negotiations made to secure that
loan. It is immaterial that Humston, according to plaintiff's
testimony, later said to plaintiff: "I don't know what you
folks got out of it, but I am satisfied with it. I will have a
little over nine thousand dollars when I pay some few bills."
At that time Humston did not know that plaintiff had misled
him when he induced him to reduce the price. When Humston learned that he had been misled he filed his complaint
with the commissioner.
The present case is clearly distinguishable from Schomig
v. Keiser, 189 Cal. 596 [209 P. 550], on which plaintiff relies,
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. for in that ease it was held that the licensee's fraudulent
conduct was unconnected with his activities and duties as a
broker.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibsoa., C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spellee, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion is based
upon the premise that "In determining this appeal it is not
necessary to discuss the scope of review by the trial court of
the commissioner's proceedings (see Dare v. MedicaZ Examiners,21 Cal.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Sipper v. Urban,22 Cal.
2d 138, 140 [137 P.2d 425]), for even if the record of these
proceedings is read as if the evidence before the commissioner
had been taken by the trial court itself, the trial court's decision finds no support in the evidence."
The italicized statement is not borne out by the record, and
this error in premise has resulted in an erroneous conclusion.
The fact is that at a hearing before defendant Real Estate
Commissioner upon a complaint filed against plaintiff Rattray
by one Humston, the evidence adduced was not only confiicting in some respects but such facts as were established without
dispute gave rise to conflicting inferences. The commissioner
resolved the conflict against plaintiff and concluded that the
revocation of his license was warranted. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§§ 10176f, 10177f.)
In reviewing the matter upon an alternative writ 01. mandate, the superior court received in evidence only a transcript
of the record made at the commissioner's hearing. From this
record and the conflicting showing therein, the superior oourt
concluded that in revoking plaintiff's license, the commissioner
"acted arbitrarily, capriciously and contrary to law and that
his findings and order are unsupported by the evidence," and
that plaintiff "tpas not guilty 01 any conduct which constituted fraud or dishonest dealing . ... "
From the facts I am convinced that the learned trial judge
was justified in concluding, as he did, that plaintiff was not
guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing, or other conduct warranting the revocation of his license as a real estate broker. Such
being the state of the record, the question arises as to the
power of the trial court to review the factual determination
of III admjnjstrative agency. On this question the views of
the .-hers of this court have been and are in sharp dis-
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agreement. (See Sipper v. Urban, 22 Ca1.2d 138 [137 P.2d
425]; Russell v. Miller, 21 Ca1.2d 817 [136 P.2d 318]; Dare
v. Medical Examiners, 21 Ca1.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Laisne
v. California St. Bd. of Optomet1'Y, 19 Ca1.2d 831 [123 P.2d
457], and order denying petit.ion for hearing in W1Jatt v. Gerf,
64 Cal.App.2d 732 fl4!l P.2d 309].) The majority \'iew is
that in a mandamus proceeding to review the action of an
administrative board, the findings and order of the board
have not the finality of a court judgment, and, although no
new evidence is received. the court can make findings and conclusions and render judgment contrary to the determination
reached by such board. The minority view is that the factual
determination of the administrative board is binding on thl'
court unless it is lacking in evidentiary support, and that rl'lief should be sought by certiorari rather than by mandamus.
In his dissenting opinion in the Laisne case, supra, Chief
Justice Gibson said at page 868: "Where there is neither
a constitutional nor statutory requirement that a court make
the determination of fact or reweigh the evidence upon which
the administrative agency acted, the duty of the judicial
branch is adequately fulfilled by a review upon certiorari
which extends to the questions of law involved. A review upon
the issues of law would. of course, include such questions as
whether the agency has regularly pursued the authority vested
in it, whether it had acted arbitrarily and whether there is
substantial evidence to support its determinations of fact.
Our decisions have recognized that administrative rulings on
questions of law cannot be accorded finality. Such questions
may be determined conclusively only by a court exercising
constitutional judicial power. [Citing authority.] Upon
issues of fact, howev.er, where there is no constitutional requirement that the facts be Judicially determined and no statutory indication that the review was meant to extend to a
re-examination of questions of fact, the court shotild uphold
the administrative determination unless it is found that there
is no substantial evidence to support the finding . ..• The proceeding in mandamus in the present case should be treated n~
a proceeding in certiorari [citing authority], and the judo"
ment of the trial court should be affirmed." (Empha~i:,
added.) Mr. Justice Edmonds and Mr. Justice Traynor COllcurred with the chief justice in his dissenting opinion in the
Laisne case. In his dissenting opinion in the Dare case, mpra,
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Mr. Justice Traynor stated at page 805: "In an actual certiorari proceeding, the court would be confined to the record of
the proceedings before the administrative board, and the
board's determination would be quashed if the record disclosed that the board had acted outside its jurisdiction, or
had made serious errors of law in the exercise thereof, or that
its decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Under
the system devised by the majority, howev~r, the record i"
considered and weighed along with other evidence, a procedure unknown to the common law." The chief justice and
Mr. Justice Edmonds concurred with Mr. Justice Traynor in
his dissenting opinion in the Dare case. While the majority
opinion in the case at bar is written on the theory that the
rules applicable to mandamus and not certiorari are here involved, it fails to apply said rules, and. in fact, applies the
rules applicable to certiorari.
It must be conceded that this is a proceeding in mandamus
and that the sole question here involved is whether there is
any substantia] evidence to support the findings of the trial
court. The majority opinion answers this question in the n~a
tive, but fails to review and consider the evidence in the light
of the conflicting inferences deducible therefrom, from which
it is obvious that there is ample evidentiary support for such
findings. The majority opinion sets forth in haec verba and
at great length the findings of the Real Estate Commissioner
determining the facts adverse to plainti1I, and concludes that
these findings are sustained by the evidence. Said opinion
also sets forth brief excerpts from the findings of the tria J
court which determined the facts contrary to the findings of
the commissioner, and then concludes that "the trial court's
decision finds no support in the evidence. II This statemenr" ---- ....
in the majority opinion is refuted by the record.
The evidence which amply supports the superior court's
findings and conclusions. and the inferences of which it is
reasonably susceptible may be epitomized as follows:
In January, 1943, plainti1I Rattray, who had for more than
35 years been operating as a real estate broker in California.
was associated with the firm of Kelly & Son in Bakersfield.
On January 19th, using a firm letterhead, he addressed a letter of inquiry to John L. Humston, stating that the firm understood that Mr. Humston owned certain auto court property
which he might wish to sell and that they would "be pleased
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to receive the price and terms acceptable to you, and enclose

stamped envelope for your reply."
Mr. Humston, then a second lieutenant in the Army, stationed in Ohio, replied on February 4th, stating: "We would
like to sell this property the price is $13,000 and we might
take a small second mortgage. . . . We would like to sell the
court and would consider any fair offer.... "
When Mr. Rattray discussed with Mr. Kelly listing the
property through the office of Kelly & Son, Mr. Kelly instructed him to procure an opion, saying, so he testified:
"I told Rattray that due to my-due to a good many dealings I had' had with Mr. Humston which were unsuccessful,
and that he was a troublemaker, that the only manner in
which I would deal would be on an option for it and a consideration was paid."
Rattray wrote Humston on February 11th mentioning that
there was a prospective buyer for the property in Taft (this
was not the ultimate purchaser), and that they had had the
property appraised. He then said: "Considering the age of
the buildings and furniture, which has a heavy depreciation.
a fair price would be $12.000. To this we would have to add
the selling commission. presuming that we can arrive at a
mutually satisfactory basis. We are enclosing herewith an
option for your signature. Upon receipt of the signed option
and your reply, we will proceed with the work of closing the
sale. Please state what terms you are willing to make in the
space marked with the cross. It may be that our client will
not require any terms but in the event he should, we would
like to know what to quote him."
This letter and the option. which was in standard form,
-and named Kelly & Son as optionee, were received by Humston at San Diego. He understood the wording of the document and wrote in it the following terms for payment of a
$12,000 purchase price, to wit: "$10,000 cash $2,000 at 8%."
He signed the option and mailed it back to Kelly & Son without comment. By the terms of the option Humston agreed to
sell the property to Kelly & Son within 60 days for $12,000.
Thereafter, on February 20th, Rattray advertised the
property in a local paper for sale at $15,000; later it was advertised at $13,500. On March 20th Rattray wrote Humston
that he had been working diligently to find a purchaser for
the court but that two obstacles in the way of effecting a sale
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had been: "First, the district being unrestricted has been
objeC'tionable to two or three people who otherwise might
ha\'{' considered the property. The second objection is the
priC'c .. , He also stated: "Our purpose Tor writing you this
morning is to inquire whether you would consider $10,000.00
cash. as we ha\-e a prospect now who will likely pur('.hase this
property providing we can do some financing for him. . ..
We ... believe that under present conditions you would be
wise in accepting this cash offer. providing we are able to
arrange the financing as hereinabove referred to. Will you,
therefore. let us know immediately if this will be acecptable
to you so that we can proceed with our work. In the event
you would consider this offer, we would most likely be able to
give you definite information on the sale within the period
of our exclusive listing."
Following the receipt of this letter, Humston was in Bakersfield and talked with Rattray personally. Rattray showed
him the advertisements, promised to work diligently on the
property, anci asked him to reduce the price another $2,000
t.o make it easier to selL About this time one Espey caUed at
the office of Kelly & Son in response to the $13,500 advertisement, but he had only $400 cash. Rattray does not recall
whether he mentioned Espey to Humston as a prospective
buyer. At any rate, on April 2<'1 Rattray wrote Humston at
San Diego as follows:
"As we expected to hear from you before Jeaving Bakersfield and not having received any word, we are wondering
if we misunderstood you. The party we have been negotiatin/! with has telephoned us twice since we talked with you,
requesting that we give him an answer. . . . As our time is
running sllOrt under our option, we would like to either proceed with our work of endeavoring to get this property
finnnced so as to give you $10,000.00 cash for your Court
property, or if we should be unsuccessful in accompJishing
this. or should you not be wiIling to accept this offer. then
we would like to continue our efforts to find another purchaser.... We would also like to know if you would extend
our option for another 60 days, provided we are unable to
consummate a deal for ~-ou before our time expire.q. We would
appre<.'iate an answer from you by wire.... "
On April 6th, in response to this letter, Humston wired:
"'Yill take ten thous/md seven fifty net."
On April 15th, which was the last day of the option, Rat-
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tray called Humston by telephone. He told him that he could
not find anyone who could pay $10,000 cash; that the only
way that they could get that amount of cash was for them to
buy the property themselves. Humston offered to sell for
$10,500. Rattray refused the offer. Humston then stated he
would take $10,250 cash~ Rattray asked that this offer be
confirmed by wire. and told Humston that Mr. Kelly was buying the property. Humston thereupon wired, "Will take ten
thousand two hundred and fifty net cash within thirty days."
Following the telephone conversation Rattray opened an
escrow and forwarded to Humston for execution a deed of
the property to Mr. Kelly. Later escrow instructions were
sent. Humston understood the purport of these documents,
and in fact added two paragraphs to the escrow instructions
imposing certain specifications of his own. He knew that he
was selling his property to Mr. Kelly for a cash price of
$10,250. However, he testified that he thought Mr. Kelly
would resell it only for an amount which would give him a
selling commission of 5 per cent and expenses. Instead of
this, Mr. Kelly consummated a deal whereby he arranged certain financing, and thus procured a higher profit.
Negotiations had been kept open with the prospect Espey.
On April 16th, the day after the Kelly purchase, Mr. Rattray
telephoned Espey, stating that the~' could put through a deal
for him at $13,500. This deal was consummated. Most of the
details were arranged on April 16th. Espey paid in his $400.
1\'[1'. Kelly procured a $12,500 loan from a private individual
who had faith and confidence in hIs recommendation. The
money was advanced in two installments, on April 16th and
April 30th. This loan was secured by first mortgage on the
property purchased and also on other property owned by
Espey. The sum of about $700, needed to complete the transac"
tion, was represented by a 'second mortgage to Mr. Kelly. The
profit to Mr. Kelly amounted to $2.326.25, of which R.attray
received some $900.
Humston paid no commission to Rattray or Kelly & Son
for handling his property. He admittedly knew that a sale
and resale were contemplated. A few days after April 15t11
he made a trip to Bakersfield and talked with Mr. Espey
but did not ask him how much he paid for the property. He
also called at the office of Kelly & Son, and according to the
testimony of Rattray, said: "I don't know what you folks
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got out of it, but I ani satisfied with it. I will have a little
over nine thousand dollars when:r pay some few bills." Latar
he discovered the price to Espey and filed a complaint with
the Real Estate Commissioner.
The superior court found that at the hearings before the
commissioner there was no evidence that plaintiff was acting
as agent for Humston; that Humston never agreed to pay
any commission to plaintiff; that Humston executed the
option of February 15th; that at no time did the relationship of principal and agent ever exist between plaintiff and
Humston, nor did any relationship of trust and confidence
ever exist between them; that in the handling of the transac·
tion plaintiff was not guilty of any conduct which constituted
fraud or dishonest dealing and that he did not act or conduct
himself in any manner which would warrant the denial of his
application for a license or for a renewal thereof.
The facts afford ample support for the conclusion that
the relationship created by Humston's dealings with Rattray
was that of vendor and purchaser, and not that of principal
and agent. A1il said in the case of Smith v. Blodget, 187 Cal.
235, 240 [201 P. 584]: "Whether an agreement permitting
a person 'to sell' laid on certain terms creates the relation
of principal and agent or that of vendor and purchaser under
a contract of sale depends upon the intention of the parties.
(James on Law of Option Contracts, § 114.) Where there was
a revocable authorization to a firm of real estate agents to
sell land for ten thousand dollars net to the owners, with an
agreement to pay 'a commission of all over said sum of ten
thousand dollars net, for which they may sell said property
with our consent,' it was held in this state that a sale by the
firm under this agreement was effected in the capacity of
vendor on its own account and not as agent of the owners of
the land. (Robinson-v~IEcistoii,--Eldridge ~ 00., 93 Cal. 80,
[27 Am.St.Rep. 167, 28 P. 796).} The determining factor in
that case was the direct interest in and right to a part of the
proceeds of the sale which was granted to the persons making
the sale. The written instrument in the case at bar contains
no express provision that plaintiffs shall retain that portion
of the purchase price which exceeds the specified selling price,
. . • But the broad and unrestricted provision giving Smith
the right to effect a sale at a net price to the owners of one
hundred dollars per acre is susceptible of sundry interpretations. .•. The case here presented is one where the intention

)

May 1946]

/)

RA'1"l'RAY tJ. SCUDDER
[28 C.2d 214: 169 P.2d 371]

'233

of the parties is imperfectly express~ and the ~guage employed by them is ambiguous and requires interpretation. It
was, therefore, permissible for the. court to take into consideration the construction placed upon the instrument by the
various persons concerned. (Mitau v. Roddan, 149 Cal. [11 2,
14, [6 L.R.A.N.S. 275. 84 P. 145].) Taking into consideration the· dealings previously set forth,the various assignments
of the option and the manner in which the sale was conducted
by all the persons involved, the evidence must be held sufficient
to support the finding of the trial court 'that the said instrument was acted upon and construed by the grantors thereof
and all the parties to this action as an option and not as a
mere agency authorization'."
The doctrine of this case has been recognized and applied
in Ruess v. Baron, 217 Cal. 83 [17 P.2d 119]; Tufts v. Mann,
116 Cal.App. 170 r2 P.2d 500J; and Cook v. La Vina Land
Co .. 3 Cal.App.2d 21 [39 P.2d 458]. The rule is stated in the
Restatement of the Law of Agency, sections 13b and l3c, page
46. in part aR follows: "A real estate broker whose sole function is to find someone who will enter into a transaction with
the owner of land is ordinarily an agent, but the agreement
with him may be such that he has no fiduciary duties and
hence is not an agent. The facts in each case must be considered in determining whether or not it is understood that the
primary obligation of one party is to act for the benefit of
the other. , •. "
Applying the above test and looking to the facts here to
ascertain the intent of the parties, it is apparent that there
was never any intent on the part of Kelly &; Son or Rattray
to create with Humston a principal-agent relationship. Indeed both testified to a specific intent to avoid creating that
relationship by means of taking an option.. Rattray confirmed - .
Kelly's testimony in this respect, saying in response to the
question, "Then, will you state to the Commissioner why it
was you took the option in the name of Kelly &; Sons! A. The
simple reason that when I got the letter back from Lt. Hum.ston, I listed -my letter with his reply-I took the letter to
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Kelly said to me, 'Rattray, the only way I will
deal with that man is on option-too much trouble with him
in the past.' I therefore made up an option and sent it to
Lt. Humston for his signature."
The testimony of Humston as to his intent shows that he
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knew that he was making a sale of the property to Kelly and
that Kelly would resell it, and that he also knew that the
property wa". being quoted at $15,000 to· $13,500 and that
Kelly would make a profit, but he erroneously assumed that
there was a state law which would limit the profit to the same
amount as a 5 per cent commission. Although Humston may
originally have believed that he was hiring Rattray as his
agent to sell hi!;: property at the best price obtainable, he could
hardly have continued to so believe after the negotiations
concerning a cash deal. when after considerable dickering the
cash price of $10.250 was agreed upon.
In short, the evidenc€' shows no more than that one of the
parties to the t.ransaction had a specific intent to create a
vendor-purchaser relationship. and the other party may have
at the inception of the transaction had a vague idea of creating a principal-agent relationship, but abandoned this intent after dealing at arm's length relative to a cash sale. In
such circumst.ances the option agreement must be construed
as pure option. and nothing more.
That Rattray was not guilty of any fraudulent or dishonest dealing is obvious. He procured for Humston the highest
cash price obtainable for the property. No person was found
who would buy the property on net cash terms for any greater
sum or at all. In fact, the only way a sale for cash could be
consummated was through the financing efforts of Mr. Kelly,
which lay beyond any duty he would have undertaken as a
mere selling agent. The regular channels for financing were
closed. No standard lending institution would give a $12,500
loan on a $13.1)00 purchase price. with only 8 $400 down payment, nor is it customary for selling agents to take a second
mortgage. Mr. Kelly himself was unwilling to embark upon_.
profit
so uncertain ad~aJ unless he would stand to
other than 8 commission: in other words, unless he could
make a cheap enough cash purchase of the property, he could
not afford to take the chance of financing Espey. When he
found he could get the property for $10,250, he promptly
approached an indi"idual lender, with whom he had been having dealings for more than twenty-five years, and procured
from him the $12,500 loan. He stood the expense of the double
transfer, and was required to take a second mortgage to
secure a portion of the amount which he was to receive for
this service. All this was done in order to make a cash deal
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for Humston who professed to be satisfied with the sum which
he netted.
While persuasive arguments may be advanced against the
practice of using options in place of listing agreements in
cases of this character, it should be the law that where an
option is used and both parties understand the purport of its
language, and lmow that a sale and resale at a profit is contemplated. the relationRhip i~ that of vendor and purchaser
and not of principal and agent.
The majority opinion fails to give due consideration to the
details of the purchase of the property by Kelly for cash and
the sale of it to Espey who was able to make a down pa~"1Ilent
of only $400. Humston knew he was selling the property to
Kel1y for $10,250 net. He was told by Rattray that they
would have to do some fina.ncing in order to sell t.he property,
which was tll(, truth. He never asked Rattray to advise him
as to the purchase price which Kelly received for the property. In fact it was none of his concern. He had received the
sum of $10.250 which was agreed upon as the net cash price
to him. and he was satisfied. Certainly, in view of these facts·
the trial court was not compelled t.o conclude that Rattray
was guilty of fraud or dishonest conduct in connection with
this transaction To so hold would be equivalent to saying
thllt if the Real Estat.e Commissioner had found Rattray not
:!uilty. mandamlls would nevertheless lie to compel him to re\'oke Rattra:,,'s ]j('ense.
The majority opinion contains several statements which
lire not supported b~' the record. Said opinion states "The
evidence shows without con:fli('t that plaintiff was employed
rb~' Hllm~ton 1 as 8 brokf'r." The opinion then proceeds with
fin interpretlltion of the eviden('e which is clearly contrary
to the views expre.'!sed by tIle trial court thereon. I am condnecd that thl' interp.1'f'tlltion placed on the evidence by the
trill 1 ('ourt is clearb' ('orreet.
The opinion states that "The correspondence initiating
th(' relation bf'tween Humst.on a.nd plaintiff leaves no doubt
that pla.intiff offered Humston his services as a broker and
t.hat T-Iuml'lton retElined him in that capacity." ThiR statem('nt is in('orrect. The oridnalletter from Rat.tra.y to Humst.on. which I have alread~.- quoted. con1ains no stRtement from
",hiI'll the ('rf'ation of an a~el1cy or fiillleinry relationship ('QuId
be implied. On the contrary, it reads as an offer to purchase,
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saying that the firm would be pleased to receive from Humston,
"The price and terms acceptable to you, and encl(lse stamped
envelope for your reply." The letter implied, if anything,
that the firm was representing a prospective buyer, and would
deal with the seller at arm's length.
The second letter to Humston does speak of a "fair price"
of $12,000 to which "we would have to add the selling commission presuming that we can arrive at a mutually satisfactory basis," but it obviously makes a loose use of the term
"selling commission," without stating the amount of that
commission or stating what the "mutually satisfactory basis"
would be, and it expressly mentions in two places that an
"option" (enclosed for signature) will be required. It also
speaks of the prospective buyer as "our client," and makes no
reference to Humston as a client.
These letters, considered in the light of the evidence as a
whole, clearly give rise to conilicting inferences as to the
nature of the relationship between Humston and Kelly & Son,
or Rattray. Hence the majority opinion is incorrect in its
.~t.atement that the letters "show indisputably that plaintiff
offered his services and was employed to find a purchaser
willing and able to acquire the property for $12,000.00 plus n
selling commission to plaintiff." Furthermore, even if a selling commission were contemplated there is nothing whatsoever
limiting or fixing the amount of that commission. Plaintiff's
statement, quoted in the majority opinion, that his purpose
was to get a listing or authority to sell the property makes no
concession respecting the terms of the listing.
The opinion states that the "evidence also shows without
coniliet that once plaintiff was employed by Humston he reported to him as a broker does to his principal." This is but
the conclusion of the author of the opinion. The inferenc:c
drawn by the trial judge, and it is a reasonable inference, is
to the contrary. At no point does the correspondence betwec:l
Humston and Rattray, or their testimony as to telephone an(.~
personal conversations, show other than that they were negotiating to arrive at a price at which Hnmston would be willing
10 sell, a cash price.
Next the opinion states that the "evidence also shows without conflict that after plaintiff secured a purc11aser for tlle
property he violated his fiduciary duties as a broker and by
untruthful and misleading statements induced his principal to
reduce the price placed upon the property and to !!Jell it to
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plaintUf's firm." This again is but the conClusion of the' author
of the opinion. The evidence, in my opinion and in that of
the trial judge, shows no fiduciary relationship. Obviously,
there was no misleading or untruthful statement made by
Rattray to Humston. He told Humston,and truthfully so,
that the price Humston was demanding wfis so high that no
cash buyer could be found; he told Humston about advertising
the property as high as $15,000; he told him of a prospective
buyer who would have to have help in financing. Mr. Kelly
was not willing to arrange this financing unless he himself
could buy the property in for cash at a low enough price. It
is also uncontradicted that Rattray truthfully told Espey of
the financing difficulty. Any sensible man would have realized
that a $400 down payment is not sufficient to finance a $13,500
purchase through any of the ordinary commercial financing
channels such as banks and other lending institutions.
Mr. Espey testified: "He rRattray] told me that day [sometime before April 1st] that there would be some doubt because
of the smallness of the down payment whether they would be
able to finance the deal, so I went home that night and sat
down and figured approximately for the purchase, showing
what I would be able to pay, that would be taking the rentals
from the property I own and the rentals on this.... I am not
sure of dates again. but a week or more later that I spoke
to him [Rattray]. He told me then he had not been able to
get Mr. Humston to reconsider the price he was asking for
the property and some doubt as to whether or not he would be
able to let me have the property for $13,000, and suggested I
leave the matter in his hands, and also said some difficulty
with financing-might be a task in order to finance the advance
interest in order to get the loan through a private party, so
I left the matter in that way."
A.t this point in the negotiations, the record shows without
confiict that if a sale was to be made to Espey it could onl~T
be-through procuring someone who would give a private loan.
Mr. Kelly and Mr. Simon of his office were able to make arrangements to borrow $12,500 from one Ceccarelli. Espey
could not obtain any loan on the property at all because of
the small amount of cash which he had; he could not make
the purchase at all without financing aid afforded by Mr. Kelly.
The basic misconception of the majority opinion is its failure
to recognize that in the profit made by Mr. Kelly on the two
transactions there was no overreaching of H umston. The m-
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dence not only supports the trial judge's conclusion to this
effect; it shows that no other conclusion is possible. Rattray
was unable to effect any sale for cash for more than the $10,250;
Humston would only accept cash. Rattray could not even
effect the $10,250 cash sale until he found some channel
through whiclJ a resale might be made by Mr. Kelly. Hunlston's erroneous belief that the profit on a transaction of this
kind, or on any sale of real estate by an agent, is limited to
a selling commission of 5 per cent was not known to Rattray.
There is no law fixing the commission which an agent may
charge at 5 per cent and no more. In fact the custom of
charging not less than 5 per cent is more to protect brokers
from undercutting than it is to establish a customary maximum rate. Furthermore, service.'! rendered in financing are
not performed gratis, but are generally compensated by a
commission. Humston admitted that he never offered Rattray
any commission whatsoever, and also that he knew he was
selling to Kelly and that a resale was contemplated. When he
met Espey he did not even ask him how much he paid for the
property. On this point he testified: "I thought Kelly" Son
was making the deal for me-that it was all right. Why shaold
I go around and ask somebody about the deal or how much
they sold it for. I had confidence in Kelly & Son that they
had made a satisfactory deal. Q. Why didn't you at any tUne
ask Mr. Espey what price he had paid for the propertyf
A. That is the only time I ever talked to him-no reason why
I should have. . .. Q. Now, did you at any time ever ask Mr.
Kelly or Mr. Rattray what their transaction was with Mr.
Espey 1 A. No. Q. Did you ever at any time ask Mr. Kell~'
or Mr. Rattray to refund to you the portion of the profit that
they made on your transaction? A. I never. Q. Did you ever
..atany.time ever offer -to pay Mr. Kelly or Mr. Rattray any
commission for the ha'ndling of this transaction' A. I never."
Furthermore, according to Rattray, Humston said to him after
the sale: "I don't know what you folks got out of it, but I am
satisfied with it. . . ." Likewise Espey never offered to pay
a commission for either the selling or the financing.
The majority opinion implies that there was some chieaner~
by reason Qf the fact that the deals were "completed in the
same escrow." All that the record shows in this respect is thal
the title company gave the same escrow number to both transactions. However, two separate sales were effectuated and the
expenses were paid by Mr. Kelly. It was not until April 16th,
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after the option expired, that Espey put his $400 in escrow.
Each of the parties gave separate escrow instructions, and it
took over a month for the completion of all details. It is im·
material that Mr. Kelly used the proceeds of the $12,500 loan
for hi'! payment to Humston, for he himself procured that
loan; it was not procured by Espey, or from Espey.
The statement in the majority opinion that "in the light
of the uncontradicted documents and plaintiff's own testimony,
it cannot be questioned that plaintiff violated the fiduciary
duties of a real estate agent .... " is but a conclusion of the
writer. for no fiduciary or agency relationship was established.
If such a relationship had been established, or more specifically,
if the trial judge had chosen to infer that such a relationship
existed, then the cases cited in the majority opinion would be
in point, particularly those relating to the necessity of a full
disclosure. As the record stands, they are inapplicable. No
mention is made of the cases hereinabove cited, which support
the holding here annoul1ced.
The conclusion, "Nor could plaintiff have any doubt that
had Humston known this fact [that Espey was purchasing for
$13,500], he would not have sold the property to Kelly & Son,"
and that "He [Rattray J not only f:'iiled to disclose the truth
but made the misrepresentation that he was unable to sell the
property at the price placed upon it by Humston," simply
ignores the uncontradicted fact that Humston did know that
a resale was contemplated, and that a higher price was being
asked, and that it was the truth that the property could not be
sold fo·r cash for more than the price paid Humston.
The majority statement. "The findings of the trial court
that there was no evidence that plaintiff was acting as Hum·
ston's agent is so clearly inconsistent with the documentary
evidence as well as pl~intiff's own testimony that it can be
explained only as being based upon the theory that, since
plaintiff's firm had an option to purchase and did purchase the
property, plaintiff could deal with Humston at arm's length
and was not bound by any fiduciary duties," is not justified.
As already stated. the evidence bearing on the question whether
there was an agency or fiduciary relationsMp is susceptible of
conflicting inferences and the inferences drawn by the trial
court are justifiable, reasonable. and conclusive. It is true, as
the majority opinion goes on to say, that a broker can be
given an option which runs "concurrent with the agency,"
and in such case there is a fiduciary relation, and a duty of
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full disclosure. But here there is sufficient support for the
conclusion that an option only was given; there was no agency.
The cases cited in the majority opinion are therefore not
controlling.
The majority opinion then states that "The fact that Espey
had only $400.00 cash and that therefore the greater part of
the purchase price had to be covered by a loan affords no
excuse for plaintiff's conduct. From the standpoint of the
seller Espey was as much a cash buyer as one who did not
need a loan. It was immaterial to Humston whether the cash
came from the purchaser's own funds or whether he had to
secure it from 8 lender. Since Kelly & Son's sale to Espey
resulted in the receipt of approximately $12,800.00 cash it is
clear that Humston would have gained more from a sale to
Espey than the one to Kelly & Son." This statement again
shows the baRic misconception of the author. From the standpoint of the seJJer, Espey was not even a prospect, for he had
no cash to pay. There was nothing in plaintiff's conduct to
excuse. He truthfully disclosed to Hum.<Jton that he was to
sell to Kelly, and that some financing would have to be done
for the next purchaser, and Humston understood that Rattray's remuneration would come out of whatever profit was
made on the resale. The only thing that aroused Humston's
ire was that the profit was more than the 5 per cent which he
el'roneously may have inferred it would be. He has never
claimed he did not receive the fun cash price to which he
agreed.
It may be noted too that Kelly did not in fact consummate
his purchase until the option (or listing, if it be denominated
as such) had expired. Instead of receiving $10,000 cash and
$2,000 on a deferred payment as provided in the option,
Humston received $10.250 as the full purchase price of the
property. There is no uncertainty as to this agreement. It was
the subject of a telephone conversation between Rattray and
Humston. and confirmed by Humston by wire. At the time
this agreement was made, no purchaser had been found who
would pay $10,000 cash for the property except Kelly who was
able to finance the re..'lale of the property. From these facts
the trial court concluded that Rattray was not acting in the
capacity of agent or broker for Humston but was acting for
and on behalf of Kelly who was the purchaser of the property.
By reversing the judgment of the trial court in this case
the majority of this court disregard all conflicts in the evidence
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and draw all inferences and deductions from the evidence
adverse to plaintiff. The rule that all intendments are in
favor of the judgment of the trial court and that all reasonable inferences and deductions should be drawn from the
evidence in support of the judgment is entirely disregarded.
This rule has been so clearly and forcibly stated in two recent
decisions of this court that I cannot refrain from quoting
from the majority opinions therein. In the Estate of Bristol,
23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689], the court said: "The rules
of evidence, the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and
the province of a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any other civil case. (Estate of Snowball (1910),
157 Cal. 301, 305 [107 P. 598]; Estate of Barr (1924), 69
Cal.App. 16,33 [230 P. 181].) The rule as to our province is:
'In reviewing the evidence . . . all conflicts must be resolved
in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable
inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It
is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a verdict
is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate
court begins and ends with a determination as to whether
there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury.
When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from
the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute
its deductions for those of the trial court.' (Italics added.)
(Crawford v. Southern Pacific 00. (1935), 3 Ca1.2d 427, 429
[45 P.2d 183].) The rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing
the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury's
verdict. The critical word in the definition is 'substantial';
it is a door which can lead as readily to abuse as to practical
or enlightened justice. It is common knowledge among judges
. and lawyers that many cases are determined to the entire
satisfaction of trial jtidges or juries, on their factual issues, by
evidence which is overwhelming in its persuasiveness but
which may appear relatively unsubstantial-if it can be reflected at all-in a phonographic record. Appellate courts,
therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt
in favor of the finding; and in searching the record and exploring the inferences which may arise from what is found there,
to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court
should be realistic and practical. Upon such view of the law
we eannot hold that any essential finding in this case is
1IDIIapported."
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---------------------------In the Estate of R1ile, 25 Cal.2d 1 [152 P.2d 1003, 155
A.L.R. 1319J, which involved the interpretation of a contract
for the payment of a commission to a real estate broker, this
court said at page 10: "The fact is, however, that the trial
court had before it and undoubtedly did consider evidence of
the surrounding circumstances, including the Brownscombe
letter, and yet detennined that respondent broker was entitled
to his earned commission. And, in the absence of findings of
fact and conclusions of law, every intendment is in favor of
the judgment or order appealed from and it is presumed that
every fact or inference essential to the support of the order
and warranted by the evidence was found by the court. (See
Haime v. de Beaulieu (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 849, 852 [129 P.2d
345]; Bekins Van Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1942), 21 Ca1.2d
135, ]37 [130 P.2d 421J; Estate of Shaw (1927), 85 Cal.App.
518, 525 [260 P. 351]; 2 CaI.Jur. 852, § 499; 10 Cal.Jur. 741,
§ 62.) Whether, in the light of the conflicting inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, the parties by their contract intended
to provide for the payment to respondent of a commission for
his past services-which had not yet matured into a confirmed
sale and which, hence, in one sense, were service..c; in course of
rendition-in securing Willig as a bidder and prospective purchaser, or contemplated payment for future services only, was
for the determination of the trial court and its decision may
not be interfered with by us on appeal. The rule is that an
'appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpretation
[of a contract] adopted by the trial court-and not substitute
another of its own- . . . where parol evidence was introduced in aid of its interpretation, and such evidence ..• is
such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom.'
(4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.) 146-147, § 192; see also
2 Cal.Jur. 934-939, § 549.) Certainly inferences may be drawn
from the contract ~nd the surrounding circumstances here
whicll would support the finding which we must presume was
made by the trial court relative to the intention of the contracting parties."
The circumstance that the trial court in the case at bar had
before it only a transcript of the proceedings and evidence
taken before the Real Estate Commissioner does not change
the rule with respect to the function of the trial court in
determining the facts, as it cannot be questioned that under
our system of jurisprudence the trial court is the forum for
the determination of issues of fact whether those issues are
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presented by way of written or oral testimony or by ocular
observation. If such were not the case, we would have a different rule with respect to evidence submitted in the form
of deposition or affidavit than tliat received in the form of
ora] testimony and ocular observation. It is clear that under all of the authorities the function of the trial court in
the determination of the facts is the same regardless of
the form in which the evidence is presented.
In my opinion there is clear, positive, convincing and
substantia] evidence in the record in this case to support
the findings of the trial court and the judgment based
thereon should be affirmed.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June
18, 1946.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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